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Abstract. The study of intergenerational mobility deals with questions regarding the opportunities of 
children  and  how  their  long  run  economic  outcome  is  related  to  their  family  background.  Most 
importantly, from a policy point of view, it is trying to understand the sources of persistence in economic 
status across generations. In this paper we study how family’s decisions about investments in human and 
non-human capital of children are an important determinant of adult’s earnings, and thus of persistence in 
income differentials. We propose a theoretical model of investment in children that allows parents to have 
different preferences in the framework of a collective model of household behavior, and investigate how 
the intra-household distribution of power affects children outcomes and the transmission of economic 
status across generations. The results altogether suggest that failure to account for intrahousehold balance 
of power as source of household heterogeneity might affect the interpretation of the structural parameters 
of interest and the evaluation of both earnings and consumption persistence. 
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1     Introduction 
The term social mobility indicates the change from an initial to a final social position, 
which  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of  absolute  or  relative  income  levels,  social  class, 
occupational status, and so on. In particular, intergenerational mobility (as opposed to 
intragenerational  mobility)  refers  to  changes  in  social  status  between  different 
generations  of  the  same  family  (Checchi  and  Dardanoni  2002),  and  represents  an 
important aspect of a country’s income inequality.  
The topic of intergenerational mobility is particularly interesting from a policy point 
of view, since it deals with questions regarding the opportunities of children and how 
their  long  run  economic  outcome  is  related  to  their  family  background.  If  a  child’s 
economic success is largely unpredictable on the base of family background we could 
reasonably claim that the society provides equality of opportunity. On the contrary, it 
might be hard to accept differences in outcomes that are due for the most part to an 
unleveled playing field.  If parents’ money is an important determinant of children’s 
future  economic  success,  then  government  intervention  might  be  warranted  on  both 
equity  and  efficiency  grounds,  providing  a  rationale  for  government  programs  that 
distribute  resources  to  low  income  families  or  invest  in  children  directly.  Thus,  an 
understanding  of  the  extent  of  intergenerational  mobility  in  different  societies  is 
important to inform public policies dealing, for example, with immigration issues, access 
to education and health care. 
As  reviewed  by  Piketty  (2000),  the  topic  of  intergenerational  mobility  has  been 
traditionally controversial over many dimensions since the 19
th and 20
th centuries. Not 
only there is a relative consensus about the patterns of intergenerational mobility within 
and across countries, but there is also a lack of consensus about the role of different 
mechanisms that determine the degree of intergenerational mobility across generations.  
In dealing with opportunities of children, the study of the family might be seen as a 
natural starting point to analyze the transmission of economic status across generations. 
The  family  is,  in  fact,  the  building  block  of  analysis  in  the  seminal  theories  of 
intergenerational mobility (Becker and Tomes 1979, Becker and Tomes 1986, Mulligan   3 
1997 among others). The standard convention in these models is to treat the household 
as a single decision maker rather than a decision unit composed by different members. 
The unitary model characterizes the household as a decision unit where individuals share 
the same preferences or pool their resources. In this sense the unitary approach fails to 
consider  that  the  household  is  a  dynamic  organisation  of  individuals  with  different 
preferences. This is why the unitary models prove inadequate for the study of certain 
demographic  issues  and  to  evaluate  the  inequality  underlying  the  intra-household 
distribution of the resources.  
In  this  paper  we  propose  an  extension  of  Becker  and  Tomes  (1979,  1986)  and 
Mulligan (1997) models of intergenerational mobility using the collective models of the 
household (Chiappori 1988, 1992), and we analyze how this different approach affects 
the definition and interpretation of the structural parameters of interest in the analysis of 
intergenerational mobility. 
 
2   Background and Related Research 
The interest in the laws governing the transmission of characteristics across generations 
recognizes in Galton one of the earliest contributors. Galton (1877, 1886) argues that 
there  is  a  positive  correlation  between  parents’  and  children’s  characteristics.  He 
observes a degree of regression to the mean (mediocrity) in the transmission of height 
across  generations.  This  means  that  if  parents  have  an  “exceptional”  characteristic 
(height), their children will inherit it only in part. Goldberger (1989) defines mechanical 
Galton’s  type  models  of  intergenerational  mobility,  which  are  distinguished  from 
economic – or choice based- models of intergenerational mobility. The characteristic of 
the economic approach is that it does not consider the transmission of economic status 
between  generations  as  the  result  of  a  mechanical  process,  but  it  views  individual 
choices and behaviors as its key determinant.  
The existing literature has approached the topic of intergenerational mobility in two 
complementary ways. In the sociological tradition, transition matrices are primarily used 
to represent transition probabilities among different discrete categories defined on the   4 
base of education, social or occupational status, and in general relevant social ranks. In a 
transition  matrix  the  comparison  between  the  marginal  distributions  of  fathers  and 
children gives an indication of what in the literature is indicated as structural mobility 
(Erikson and Goldthorpe 2002: 35). This needs to be distinguished from the concept of 
exchange mobility which measures the association between the status of parents and 
children as summarized by the odds ratios
2. An advantage of transition matrices is that 
they allow researchers to visualize how different transmission mechanisms may be at 
work at different points of the income distribution.   
The other approach to measure intergenerational mobility, which is the most widely 
used in the economic literature, is based on the least square estimator of a first order 
autoregressive process linking father and child’s income: 
t t t e bY c Y + + = −1 ,                                                                                                     (2) 
where  1 , t t Y Y −  indicate, respectively, the permanent income of the adult child and of 
his/her father (usually measured in logarithms
3) and  t ε  a random component capturing 
other influences. In this framework,  b  indicates the strength of the relation between 
father and children’s incomes or, equivalently, the fraction of the income differences 
among parents that is typically observed among their adult children. Large values of b 
indicate high degree of  intergenerational persistence (low degree of intergenerational 
mobility). Most empirical estimates report a value of  b  between zero and one, and the 
quantity  b − 1   is  defined  as  the  degree  of  intergenerational  mobility  or  degree  of 
regression to the mean. If  b <0 high income parents have low income children and if 
b >1 income regresses away from the mean. A society characterized by a high degree of 
                                                 
2 The odds ratio is a measure of disparity of opportunities for children from different origins. An odds 
ratio of 1 indicates the absence of association between origin and destination (Checchi and Dardanoni 
2002).  
3 Economists are usually more interested in regression to the mean in logarithmic or percentage terms. As 
noted by Mulligan (1997: 25), economic growth tends to multiply incomes and produce regression away 
from the mean in absolute terms but not in percentage terms.      5 
intergenerational mobility is often said to be a society of “equality of opportunity”, since 
children’s position is not determined by their parents’ socioeconomic status
4.  
The fact that the mobility literature is far from achieving a consensus on how to 
measure  mobility  and  make  mobility  comparisons,  suggests  that  theoretical  analysis 
might be of special help to identify the channels of transmission and causal mechanisms 
beyond  intergenerational  persistence.  As  described  by  Checchi  (2006),  many  factors 
exhibit  intertemporal  persistence  and  can  explain  the  association  in  economic  status 
across generations. Transmission of genetic components related to ability, race, cultural 
influences, liquidity constraints, territorial segregation, discrimination and self-fulfilling 
beliefs are some examples. Different theoretical models emphasize different aspects and 
have implication for intergenerational mobility
5. A clearer understanding of the channels 
of transmission appears crucial from a policy point of view: a society might be willing to 
level the playing field if disparities arise, for example, from the presence of liquidity 
constraints, discrimination or local segregation, but might be less willing to do so if 
disparities are the results of different genetic abilities, beliefs and so on. 
Recently there has been a growing empirical literature (surveyed in Solon 1999, 
2002) that examines the association between parents and children’s income on the basis 
of equation (2). Pre Solon (1992) estimates revealed a high degree of intergenerational 
mobility especially in the United States (Becker 1991). However, Solon (1992, 1999) 
shows that first generation estimates are largely downward biased due to measurement 
errors and unrepresentative samples. When corrections based on multiyear averages of 
income or instrumental variables are applied, the estimated degree of intergenerational 
persistence is substantially higher, around 0.4 
6. 
                                                 
4  However,  regarding  this  point,  Roemer  (2004)  points  out  that  we  should  be  careful  in  interpreting 
equality of opportunities as complete intergenerational mobility He argues that equality of opportunities 
(EOp) “views inequality of outcomes as indefensible when and only when they are due to differential 
circumstances. Inequalities due to differential efforts are acceptable.” (Roemer 2004: 50). 
5 See Piketty (2000) for an excellent review of the theoretical models of intergenerational mobility. 
6 For some recent work see, for example, Mazumder (2005), Lefranc and Trannoy (2005).   6 
The theoretical framework for the estimation of equation (2) is represented by the 
seminal work of Becker and Tomes (1979)
7. They assume two overlapping generations. 
Each family is composed by one parent and one child. Let  1 − t  ,  t indicate the father 
and children’s generation, respectively. Children’s permanent income  t Y , is assumed to 
depend  on  parents  investment  in  children’s  human  and  non-human  capital,  and 
children’s  ability  ( ) t a .  The  parent  maximizes  his/her  utility  which  depends  on  own 
consumption  and  children’s  permanent  income  subject  to  a  budget  constraint. 
Computing the optimal investment in children gives the following relationship between 
child and parent’s permanent income: 
1 t t t Y Y a β α − = + .                                                                                                       (3) 
This  equation  summarizes  Becker  and  Tomes  (1979)  main  result  and  illustrates  two 
channels of intergenerational correlation;  β  depends on the returns on investments and 
parent’s degree of altruism, and represents the causal effect of parent income on children 
income.  Furthermore,  incomes  might  be  correlated  also  because  ability  is  correlated 
across generations. Thus, estimates of b in (2) can be considered as a reduced form 
estimate  of  equation  (3).  Reduced  form  estimates  represent  an  important  descriptive 
measure  of  intergenerational  mobility,  but  they  lack  a  structural  interpretation. 
Identifying  the  magnitude  of  the  different  intergenerational  sources  of  earnings 
correlation would appear crucial from a policy point of view, but identification issues are 
complex and relatively few studies have tried to identify the causal effect of parental 
income on child’s economic success.
8  
Thus,  rather  then  pursuing  an  abstract  objective  of  zero  intergenerational 
correlation,  a  better  approach  is  to  investigate  the  mechanisms  of  intergenerational 
transmission. Building on their previous work, Becker and Tomes (1986) emphasize the 
                                                 
7 Solon (2004) extends Becker and Tomes and clarifies the links between theoretical and applied research 
in order to rationalize log-linear intergenerational income regressions commonly estimated 
8 See for example Shea (2000) and Maurin (2002) for a use of instrumental variables and semiparametric 
techniques to solve identification issues. A different approach has been followed by Bowles and Gintis 
(2002), who decompose the intergenerational correlation coefficient into additive components reflecting 
the contribution of various causal mechanisms.   7 
importance  of  liquidity  constraints  in  explaining  income  persistence.  Investments  in 
human and non human capital are now distinguished and capital markets are assumed to 
be imperfect. The introduction of credit constraints identifies two groups of families. For 
the first group credit constraints are not binding, and families act as if capital markets 
were perfect. Since children earnings do not depend directly on family characteristics but 
depend directly on ability, and since ability is correlated across generations, earnings 
regress to the mean at the rate predicted by the transmission of ability. For another group 
of families, however, constraints are binding. In this case children earnings depend on 
parental  earnings  directly  -because  credit  constraints  limit  investments  in  the  human 
capital of children- as well indirectly-because ability persists across generations. Thus, 
earnings  regress  to  the  mean  at  a  slower  rate  in  borrowing  constraints  families.  As 
emphasized  by  Mulligan  (1997),  the  model  has  implications  also  for  the  degree  of 
intergenerational consumption mobility. Since earnings regress faster to the mean across 
generations  in  the  first  group,  parents  use  bequests  to  smooth  consumption  across 
periods and allow children to consume beyond the child’s own earnings. The theoretical 
prediction is that consumption does not regress to the mean. This can be viewed as an 
extreme form of a general prediction according to which intergenerational correlation of 
consumption  is  greater  than  that  of  earnings.  For  the  other  group  of  families,  credit 
constraints means that parents are less able to smooth consumption across generations, 
and thus consumption regresses to the mean. As emphasized in Mulligan (1997, 1999), 
under some assumptions the Becker and Tomes (1986) model derives strong predictions 
about the degree of intergenerational mobility of consumption and earnings, predictions 
that are unique to the economic approach to the study of intergenerational mobility. 
Some of the predictions are refused and others accepted.  
Some empirical literature used the insights of Becker and Tomes to test the presence 
of distortions caused by credit constraints. One way to investigate the importance of 
credit constraints is by means of cross countries studies (Björklund and Jännti 1997). If 
credit constraints are the key source of persistent inequality, then those countries with 
better  welfare  systems  and  institutional  arrangements  for  the  public  provision  of   8 
schooling and health, for example, should have greater intergenerational mobility, since 
institutions  contribute  to  alleviate  credit  constraints.  However,  Grawe  and  Mulligan 
(2002) and Han and Mulligan (2001) provide an alternative explanation. The authors 
argue  that  if  ability  heterogeneity  across  countries  is  high,  it  is  difficult  to  interpret 
differences across countries as results of difference in credit constraints. 
One  of  the  predictions  of  the  model  is  that  earnings  in  borrowing  constrained 
families regress slower to the mean than earnings in non-borrowing constrained families. 
Furthermore, the direct relationship between child and parent’s earnings is likely to be 
concave  rather  than  linear  “because  obstacles  to  the  self-financing  investments  in 
children  decline  as  parents  earnings  increase.”  (Becker  1991:  251).  Thus,  a  second 
approach investigates the presence of nonlinearities in the pattern of intergenerational 
mobility  across the income distribution. This approach has been emphasized, among 
others, by Corak and Heisz (1999) and Grawe (2004) who reach different conclusions 
about the role of credit constraints in explaining intergenerational mobility.  
Other authors divide families into two groups according to their likelihood of being 
constraint.  Mazumder  (2005)  partitions  families  by  net  worth  and  finds  evidence 
consistent with Becker and Tomes prediction. Mulligan (1997, 1999) partitions families 
based on the amount of bequests children receive or expect to receive. There is weak 
evidence that earnings regress to the mean at very different rates across the two groups. 
He also observes that consumption regresses to the mean in both groups, contrary to the 
prediction of the model. However, the data confirm the prediction of the model that 
consumption  is  more  persistent  than  earnings.  Mulligan  (1997)  stresses  how  the 
predictions of the model have implications for the way we model altruism and argues 
that only a model of endogenous altruism is able to explain the observed patterns of 
regression to the mean in consumption across generations. Mulligan develops a model in 
which  rich  people  turn  out  to  be  less  altruistic  than  the  poor,  so  that  consumption 
regresses  to  the  mean  among  families  in  which  wage-income  is  the  most  important 
source of household resources.    9 
A  related  important  issue  is  that  very  little  is  known  about  the  effect  of  family 
structure on intergenerational mobility from both a theoretical and empirical point of 
view.  More  recently,  some  authors  have  started  to  investigate  the  role  of  family 
structure, and in particular marital sorting, on the patterns of intergenerational mobility 
(see, for example, Chadwick and Solon (2002), Ermish et al. (2006)). 
However, all the models discussed above assume a consensus utility function, i.e. 
they treat the household as a single decision unit. We propose instead a theoretical model 
of  investments  in  children  that  allows  parents  to  have  different  preferences,  and 
investigate how the intra-household distribution of power affects children outcomes and 
thus  intergenerational  mobility.  This  paper  contributes  to  the  literature  by  extending 
Becker  and  Tomes  (1979,  1986)  and  Mulligan’s  (1997)  models  to  a  collective 
framework  (Chiappori  1992).  We  then  investigate  the  implications  of  this  collective 
representation  of  the  household  for  the  interpretation  of  the  structural  parameters  of 
interest and the evaluation of both earnings and consumption persistence. 
 
3     Investments in Children and Intrahousehold Balance of Power 
A. Assumptions and Framework 
In this section we use  a collective model of the household, an approach that allows 
different household members to have different preferences over goods consumed in the 
household. Consider an overlapping generation structure in which individuals live for 
two periods, and let  t t , 1 −  represent the parents and child’s generation, respectively. 
Each family is composed by two parents, a man  ( ) m  and a woman( ) f , and one child
9. 
Parents utility is assumed to depend on own consumption  f m C C ,  and child’s (expected) 
permanent income when adult,  t Y . At time  1 − t  the household divides the available 
                                                 
9  For  simplicity  we  consider  all  children  altogether,  abstracting  from  the  issue  of  allocation  of  the 
resources among different children and birth order effects. Furthermore children are assumed to have no 
direct decision power.   10 
resources between consumption and (monetary) investments in children’s human and 
non-human capital,  t I . Thus, the household budget constraint takes the following form: 
0 1 1 1 1 y y y I C C ft mt t
f
t
m
t + + = + + − − − − ,                                                                        (4) 
where  0 1, y yit− , for i=m,f represent, respectively parents’ earnings and household non-
labor  income.  Following  Becker  and  Tomes  (1979),  parents  are  assumed  to  transfer 
resources to the child by investing in children the amount  t I at the rate of return  r  . In 
this  setting  child’s  permanent  income  depends  on  three  components:  parental 
investment, ability ( ) t a  and the luck present in the market sector( ) t ε :   
( ) . 1 t t t t a I r Y ε + + + =                                                                                               (5) 
Note  that  ability  does  not  reflect  exclusively  genetic  components,  but  it  is  a  broad 
concept that refers to “endowments of capital that are determined by the reputation and 
connections  of  their  families,  the  contribution  of  the  ability,  race,  and  other 
characteristics  of  children  from  the  genetic  constitutions  of  their  families,  and  the 
learning, skills, goals, and other family commodities acquired through belonging to a 
particular family.” (Becker 1979: 1158). Given this characterization of ability, we follow 
Becker and Tomes (1979) in assuming that ability is correlated across generations in the 
following way: 
( ) 1 1 , t t t a a a η η ν − = − + +                                                                                         (6) 
where  a is the average ability in the parents’ generation,  1 − t a  is the average parental 
ability
10,  that  is 
1 1
1 2
mt f t
t
a a
a
− −
−
+
=   (see  Becker  1991),  [ ] 1 , 0 ∈ η   is  the  degree  of 
inheritability and  t v  is a white noise error term representing endowment luck. 
 
                                                 
10 A richer transmission process of ability could be used that takes into account differently mother and 
father’s ability. However, since we are manly interested in the effect of the intrahousehold distribution of 
the resources, the simple framework outlined in the text has no particular bearing on our results, as long as 
we make the reasonable assumption that  1 − t a is a generic and increasing function of individual abilities. 
We also abstract from the degree of assortative mating in abilities and endowments.   11 
B. The Household Problem 
Individual  i  is  characterized  by  differentiable,  strictly  increasing,  strictly  convex 
preferences  on  private  consumption  and  (expected)  child’s  permanent  income. 
Preferences are represented by a twice continuously differentiable utility function 
i U . 
Then, the collective household problem can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) t
m
t
m
t t
f
t
f
t Y C U Y C U Max , 1 , 1 1 1 1 − − − − − + λ λ                                                               ( ) 7  
s.t.  0 1 1 1 1 y y y I C C ft mt t
f
t
m
t + + = + + − − − −  
          ( ) , 1 t t t t a I r Y ε + + + =  
The household utility function is given by the weighted sum of individual utilities with 
weights  1 1 1 , − − − t t λ λ representing the bargaining-decision power
11 of the woman and of 
the  man,  respectively.  The  Pareto  weight  [ ] 1 0,1 t λ − ∈   is  a  function  of  exogenous 
variables that affect the household environment including in this case earnings of its 
members and unearned income
12 (Bourguignon 1999). It can also depend on a vector of 
distribution factors  s which affect the decision power of the members but not directly 
preferences, and a vector of preference factors  z
13.  1 t λ −  is assumed to be continuously 
differentiable in its arguments. In the special case in which  1 t λ −  is constant the collective 
framework  corresponds  to  the  unitary  model  with  weakly  separable  household 
preferences (Chiappori et. al. 2002).  
If we assume that parents can anticipate their children’s ability but not their market 
luck and we combine the two constraints, the household maximization problem can be 
rewritten in the following form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) t
m
t
m
t t
f
t
f
t Y C U Y C U Max , 1 , 1 1 1 1 − − − − − + λ λ                                                               (8) 
                                                 
11 In the rest of the paper the terms bargaining power, decision power, and intrahousehold balance of  
power are used interchangeably.  
12 We are assuming that the labor supply of both members is fixed. This is because both individuals are 
rationed on the labor market or because some separability property between leisure and consumption in 
individual preferences. 
13 Thus, we can write  ( ) 1 0 , , , , t m f y y y λ λ − = s z . In the rest of paper we will use  1 t λ − as short notation, 
keeping in mind that it depends on the listed variables.   12 
s.t.  1 1 1 1
− − =
+
+ = + +
+
t
t
t
f m t H
r
a
Y C C
r
Y
 
where  0 1 1 1 y y y Y ft mt t + + = − − −  and  1 t H −  is defined as family income. The new constraint 
shows that own consumption and expected child’s permanent income are determined not 
only by the exogenous  parents’ income but  also by the value of child’s endowment 
discounted to the parents’ generation, entering the budget constraint as a resource to the 
household. The first order conditions of this problem are: 
( )
( ) .
1
1
1
1
1 1
1 1
r
U
U U
U U
f
C t m
Y t
f
Y t
m
C t
f
C t
f
m f
+
= − +
− =
−
− −
− −
λ
λ λ
λ λ
                                                                       (9) 
If the utility functions are assumed to be homothetic, we get linear demand functions for 
t
i Y C , : 
( )
( ) , 1 , , ,
1
1 , ,
1
1
−
−
+ =
+
+ =
t
Y
m
Y
f
Y t
t
C
i
C
i
i
H r
r
Y
H r C
λ α α δ
λ α δ
                                                                          (10) 
for  f m i , = ;  ,
C Y
i δ δ  represent the fraction of income spent on individual consumption 
and children, respectively, and are functions of the parameters 
C
i α -which measures the 
preference  for  own  consumption  relative  to  the  income  of  children-  and 
Y
i α -which 
measures the preference for child’s income relative to own consumption- with  0 >
∂
∂
Y
i
Y
α
δ
. 
Substituting (10) into the budget constraint (4) and using the overall budget constraint in 
(8)  we get: 
( )
Y t
t
Y
t r
a
Y I δ δ −
+
− = − 1
1
1                                                                                       (11a) 
( ) t t
Y
t
Y
t a Y r Y ε δ δ + + + = −1 1 .                                                                                 (11b) 
These simple results have several intuitive implications. First, equation (11b) shows two 
important sources of earnings correlation. Parental income has a direct effect on child 
income  and  also  an  indirect  effect  if  parental  and  child  ability  are  correlated  across   13 
generations as expressed in (6). Holding ability constant, higher-income parents invest 
more in their children’s human and non-human capital. Furthermore, only a fraction 
Y δ  
of the (anticipated) child’s endowment contributes to increase the expected child’s future 
income, the rest being spent on parental consumption through a reduced investment in 
the child. In this sense child’s ability is an element that parents take into account in 
determining  the  amount  of  effort  required  to  invest  and  therefore  the  distribution  of 
resources  between  the  present  and  the  future.  Parental  investment  is  increasing  in 
parental altruism   


 


>
∂
∂
0 Y
i
Y
α
δ
 and in the return to the investment. This means that parents 
are more willing to invest in children when the payoff is higher. Finally, the collective 
setting implies that also the distribution of resources within the household affects the 
amount  invested  in  children  and  thus  their  future  economic  success,  since 
Y δ   is  a 
function  of  1 − t λ .  This  also  means  that  man  and  woman’s  earnings  have  a  different 
impact on child’s outcomes. But how does  1 − t λ  affects investments in children? There is 
a wide perception that, especially in developing countries, an increase in female power 
has a positive effect on the amount invested in children. If women spend household 
resources in a manner regarded as socially desirable, policies interventions could have 
greater  success  if  they  are  targeted  by  gender.  Thus,  understanding  how  the 
intrahousehold  distribution  of  power  affects  children’s  outcomes  is  particularly 
important from the point of view of policies dealing, for example, with child poverty. 
The next session explores this issue in more details. 
3.1  Female Power and Child Welfare 
Suppose husband and wife have different preferences over own consumption and child’s 
income as represented by the following utility function: 
( ) ( ) t i
i
t
i i Y v C u U α + = −1            ' 0, '' 0, ' 0, '' 0 u u v v > < > < ,                               (12) 
where  v u,   represents  the  utility  from  own  consumption  and  child’s  income, 
respectively,  i α   measures  the  degree  of  altruism  toward  children  and  is  assumed  to   14 
differ  between  the  spouses.  According  to  the  collective  framework,  the  household 
maximization process can be written as: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
, ,
1
m f
t
f f m m
t f t t m t
C C Y
Max u C v Y u C v Y λ α λ α − −     + + − +                            (13) 
s.t.  0 1 1 1 1 y y y I C C ft mt t
f
t
m
t + + = + + − − − −  
       ( ) t t t t a I r Y ε + + + = 1 . 
In this paper we are not concerned about changes in prices and they are treated as fixed. 
In this framework, the amount invested in the child and own consumption will depend 
on the decision power of the woman, as stated in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1. Spouses’ consumption levels are a monotonic function of female decision 
power.  As  1 − t λ increases  female  consumption  increases  and  male  consumption 
decreases. The amount  invested in children is  a non-monotonic function of  1 − t λ . An 
increase in  1 − t λ has a positive effect on investments in children if the ratio of female to 
male power is sufficiently high. 
 
Proof. Rearranging the first order conditions of the household problem we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 ' '
m m f f
t t t t u C u C λ λ − − − − − =                                                                       (14a)    
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 ' '
f f
t f t m t t r v Y u C λ α λ α λ − − −   + + − =                                                 (14b) 
t
m
t
f
t t I C C Y + + = − − − 1 1 1 .                                                                                             (14c) 
Differentiating (14a) (14b) (14c) with respect to  1 − t λ and rewriting in matrix form we 
get:   15 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1
1 1 1 1 1
2 1
1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1
1
ˆ
'' 1 '' 0
ˆ
'' 0 1 1 ''
1 1 1 ˆ
' '
' 1 '
0
f
t
f f m m t t t t t
m
f f t
t t t f t m t
t
t
t
f f m m
t t
f f
t t f m
C
u C u C
C
u C r v Y
I
u C u C
u C r v Y
λ λ λ
λ λ α λ α
λ
λ
α α
−
− − − − −
−
− − − −
−
−
− −
−
  ∂
 
∂   − −  
    ∂       − + + − =       ∂
   
  ∂    
  ∂  
  − −
 
  = − + + −  
 
   
 
where 
i
t t C I 1 1 ˆ , ˆ
− −  indicate, respectively, the optimal levels of consumption and child’s 
investment . Solving for 
1
ˆ
− ∂
∂
t
t I
λ
 by using Cramer’s rule, after some calculations we get: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
ˆ 1 1
1 ' '' ' ''
1
f f m m m m f f t
m t t t f t t t
t t f t m
I
u C u C u C u C
D
α λ α λ
λ λ α λ α
−
− − − − − −
− − −
∂   = − −   ∂ + −
 
where 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 1 1
2
1 1 1
'' 1 1 '' 1 '' ''
1 '' 1 1 ''.
f m f
t t f t m t t
m
t t f t m
D u r v u u
u r v
λ λ α λ α λ λ
λ λ α λ α
− − − − −
− − −
  = + + − + −  
  + − + + −  
  
Since  '', '' 0 u v <  we have that  0 D > , and  ( ) 1 1 1 t f t m λ α λ α − −   + −  >0. Then, it follows 
that:  
⇔ >
∂
∂
−
0
ˆ
1 t
t I
λ
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
' ''
1 '' '
f f m m
t t t m
f f m m
t f t t
u C u C
u C u C
λ α
λ α
− − −
− − −
>
−
.                                                  (15) 
This means that an increase in the female power has a positive effect on the amount 
invested in the child if and only if the ratio of female to male power is sufficiently high.  
This  result  can  be  also  restated  in  the  following  terms
14.  Let  1
~
− t λ   be  such  that 
                                                 
14 A similar proof for the case of child labor has been developed for example in Basu (2006), who obtains  
somewhat  opposite  predictions  since  he  finds  a  U-shape  pattern  for    child  labor,  which  can  be   16 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
' ''
0
1 '' '
f f m m
t t t m
f f m m
f t t t
u C u C
u C u C
λ α
α λ
− − −
− − −
− =
−
￿ ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ ￿
  







=
∂
∂
⇔
−
0
ˆ
1 t
t I
λ
.  Then,  λ λ
~
> ∀   we  have  that 
λ
λ
λ
λ
~
1
~
1 −
>
−
  and  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
' '' ' ''
'' ' '' '
f f m m f f m m
t t t t
f f m m f f m m
t t t t
u C u C u C u C
u C u C u C u C
λ λ λ λ
− − − −
− − − −
> =
<
￿ ￿
.  The  last 
inequality follows from the fact that 
m
t
f
t C C 1 1, − −  are increasing and decreasing functions of 
1 t λ − ,  respectively  (see  below),  and  ' 0, '' 0, ''' 0 u u u > < > .  From  this  it  follows  that 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
' '' ' ''
0
1 1 '' ' '' '
f f m m f f m m
t t t t t m t m
f f m m f f m m
t f f t t t t t
u C u C u C u C
u C u C u C u C
λ α λ α
λ λ
λ α α λ
− − − − − −
− − − − − −
− > − = ∀ >
− −
￿ ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿ ￿
,  or 
equivalently  λ λ
λ
~
0
ˆ
1
> ∀ >
∂
∂
− t
t I
, and the reverse is true for  .
~
λ λ <  This means that the 
amount invested first declines and then rise as female power increases, that is there is a 
U-shape relationship. A similar result can be derived if we relate the amount invested to 
the male power. Along the same lines it is possible to prove that: 
0
1 ˆ
1
1 > =
∂
∂
−
− K
D
C
t
f
t
λ
 ,  0
1 ˆ
1
1 < =
∂
∂
−
− H
D
C
t
m
t
λ
,                                                                 (16) 
since  ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
2 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1
' '' 1 '' ' 0
1 1
t f t m m t f m f
t
t f t m t
K u u r v Y u
λ α λ α α λ
λ α λ α λ
− − −
− − −
+ − − −
= − + >
+ − −
 and 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 1 '' ' '' '' 1 1 ' ' 0
f f m f m f
t t t t f t m H u C u u v Y r u u λ λ α λ α − − − −   = + + + + − + <   . 
                                                                                                                                   Q.E.D. 
                                                                                                                                           
Another interesting result can be obtained if we differentiate the first order conditions 
with respect to parents’ degree of altruism. The proof of the following proposition is 
straightforward following the lines of the proof in Proposition 1 and is left to the reader: 
 
                                                                                                                                                
characterized as a public bad. On the same lines see also Felkey (2006) for a similar proof in the case of 
household public goods that obtains a pattern opposite to us.    17 
Proposition  2.  The  amount  invested  in  children  and  individual  consumption  are 
increasing and decreasing functions of the parental degree of altruism, respectively: 
0
ˆ
>
∂
∂
i
t I
α
,  0
1 <
∂
∂ −
i
i
t C
α
, 0
1 <
∂
∂
−
−
i
i
t C
α
  for  f m i , = ;  m f i , = − . 
 
The  non-monotonic  relationship  between  female  (or  male)  power  might  be 
interesting from a policy point of view. Conventional literature have investigated the 
relationship between female power and household expenditure patterns, showing how 
greater female power increases the household budget share devoted to the consumption 
of  goods that  are socially desirable  (see Hodinottt and Hadda 1995).  This literature, 
however, has investigated linear relationships. An interesting result is obtained by Handa 
(1996). The author analyses the effect of female headship on household budget shares. 
On  average,  the  presence  of  a  female  decision  maker  increases  the  share  of  the 
household budget allocated to child and family goods. A section of the paper reports 
results from a comparison of female headed households with and without a male spouse 
living in the household. Both types of households are female headed, and thus we could 
argue  that  in  these  households  the  woman  has  a  relatively  high  bargaining  power, 
presumably  λ λ
~
> in our model. But we would also expect that the bargaining power is 
higher  if  she  is  un-partnered  rather  than  partnered.  According  to  our  model,  a 
comparison  of  these  two  types  of  households  would  be  equivalent  to  a  comparison 
between two households along the upper tail of the distribution of female power. If it is 
the  case,  then  the  model  would  predict  a  greater  impact  on  the  amount  invested  in 
children  in  the  un-partnered  households.  The  results  report  significant  differences 
favoring single female in the case of children’s wear and no significant difference for 
education.  
More  recent  literature  has  tried  to  explore  nonlinearities  in  the  effect  of  one 
member’s bargaining power on household expenditure patterns. Along these lines, for 
example, is the recent contribution of Ray et al (2006). Using a collective framework 
with  endogenously  determined  intrahousehold  balance  of  power,  they  find  that  the   18 
relative decision power of the adult decision maker significantly affect budget shares 
following a nonlinear pattern that varies across goods. The results show that there is an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between the budget share and the male power for goods 
classified as ‘necessary’ items like food and fuel and light, and a U-shaped relationship 
in the case of ‘luxury’  items, like transport and education.  If we interpret education 
expenditures as a component of our  t I , then this result is predicted by the theory. The 
authors offer an  explanation for these patterns. “Both partners have a  preference for 
luxury items over necessities. Consequently, at the extreme values of  λ the dominant 
partner is able to mould the household preferences towards the particularly luxury items 
that she/he consumes, leading a rise in its budget share and a fall in that of necessities” 
(Ray 2006: 455). This explanation might not be that compelling in the case of education, 
since education is an intergenerational investment decision that shouldn’t be viewed as a 
luxury. However, in developing countries, such as India, it might well be the case that 
education is a luxury, especially for poorer household. Still, however, it remains open 
the  question  remains  why  an  increase  in  female  power  has  a  positive  effect  on  the 
amount invested in children only if the female male decision power ratio is sufficiently 
high, or equivalently only if  λ λ
~
> . Think about a woman in a traditional family in some 
developing country, who is likely to live in a status of subjugation in the household. In 
this case, an increase in her power might be directed toward herself first rather than 
investing more in children. Positive effects on child’s investments display only at the 
point  where  the  woman  has  reached  a  certain  threshold  reference  status  level.  This 
interpretation would be consistent with a view of agents that are intrinsically egoistic (as 
argued, for example, by Mulligan 1997) and who have to make efforts to sacrifice own 
resources to invest in children. Clearly, the amount of effort required might be lower the 
greater  the  altruism  of  the  mother,  but  can  be  relatively  high  if  the  mother  is  in  a 
condition of subjugation, thereby discouraging investments in children. Certainly, more 
empirical evidence is needed to examine the relationship between individual decision 
maker’s decision power and children’s outcomes and amount spent on children, and this 
can be a very interesting area of research for future empirical work.     19 
3.2   An Illustration with Cobb-Douglas Preferences 
Suppose  preferences  take  the  following  Cobb-Douglas  form.  The  household 
maximization problem becomes: 
( ) ( )( )
m
t m t m t
f
t f t f t
Y C C
C Y C Y Max
f m 1 1 1 1 log log 1 log log − − − − + − + + β α λ β α λ                (17) 
s.t.  1 1 1 1
− − =
+
+ = + +
+
t
t
t
f m t H
r
a
Y C C
r
Y
. 
Straightforward calculations show that: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t t f t m t t f t m t t Y r Y a λ α λ α λ α λ α ε − − − − −     = + + − + + − +                      (18) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
t
t t f t m t t f t m
a
I Y
r
λ α λ α λ α λ α − − − − −     = + − − − + −     +
                      (19) 
1 1 1 1
i i t
t t i t
a
C Y
r
λ β − − −
  = +   +  
  with  λ λ λ − = 1 ,
i  for  i=f,m.                                     (20) 
Note how individual consumption levels are a monotonic functions of own bargaining 
power, while the amount invested in the child is a non-monotonic function of female 
power. In particular, by (19) we have that  1 0
1
> ⇔ >
∂
∂
− m
f
t
t I
α
α
λ
, which is equivalent to 
condition (15) for the Cobb-Douglas case
15. This simply means that an increase in a 
member’s decision power increases the amount invested in children if and only if this 
member’s degree of altruism is greater than that of the other member.  
From (18) it follows that the impact of parental income on children income depends 
on  1 − t λ  .  In this framework, we are interested in the following structural parameter: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1
1 0
1 1 , ; ,
1 i
t
t t
t f t m f m y t i t t i
it da
dY a
r Y a r
dy r
λ α λ α α α λ µ λ α − − − −
− =
    = + + − + − + =     +    
,   
                                                                                                                                       (21) 
                                                 
15 A very similar result has been derived using a different strategy by Blundell et al. (2005). They show 
that a change in a member’s Pareto weight increases the household expenditure on children if and only if 
the marginal willingness to pay of this member is more sensitive to changes in his/her share than that of 
the other member. For the Cobb-Douglas example, this reduces to the condition in the text.   20 
which  measures  the  impact  of  an  increase  in  male/female  earnings  on  child  income 
keeping ability constant. This structural parameter can be decomposed into two effects, a 
direct effect and an indirect effect (i.e. through the female bargaining power). Additional 
comments on these results will be provided later in the paper. For the moment it is worth 
to emphasize that in addition to the factors already stressed in the literature as potential 
sources of the differences in intergenerational mobility across countries or across groups, 
the collective framework allows to emphasize that differences in household structure can 
affect the degree of intergenerational mobility since the value of the structural parameter 
varies across the distribution of  λ . Furthermore, this framework allows for different 
impacts of male and female earnings on child permanent income. 
As noted in section 2, most empirical estimates of the degree of intergenerational 
mobility  cannot  identify  the  causal  effects  of  parental  income.  Furthermore,  they 
estimate empirical relationship with a unitary model of the household in mind. Here we 
show that if accept the idea that the household is better to be treated as a micro society of 
individuals, then failures to account for this aspect can lead additional sources of bias in 
the commonly estimated child-parent earnings relationships. 
Let’s rewrite equation (18) as follows: 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 t m t f m t t m t f m t t t Y r Y r Y a a α α α λ α α α λ ε − − − − = + + + − + + − + ,          (22) 
where, if  0 , 1 = λ  we are back to the unitary model. Since λ  is, by definition, a function 
of exogenous variables, we could in principle estimate it in a first stage and use it in a 
second stage to estimate equation (22). Since ability is not observed, however, we should 
treat as a part of the error term and estimate: 
( ) ( )( ) 1 1 ˆ 1 1 t m t f m t t Y r Y r Y α α α ξ − − = + + + − + , 
where  ( ) t t t m f t m t a a ε λ α α α ξ + − + = −1   and  Y Y λ = ˆ .  If  t ξ were  orthogonal  to  the 
regressors, then we could consistently estimate  ( ) ( )( ) f f m r r α α α − + + 1 , 1  . Note that 
( ) r a i t t i , ; , 1 α λ µ −   is  a  function  of  ability  (which  is  unobservable).  This  is  a  common 
problem encountered in some econometric textbooks and in the empirical estimation of   21 
earning functions in which education and ability are modeled to have both separate and 
interactive effects on earnings. In this case we cannot hope to estimate the partial effect 
across many different values of ability. Usually of more interest is the partial effect 
averaged across the population distribution of ability: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 











+
+ − + + − + = − − r
Y r r a E
a
t yi m f m m f t i t t i at 1
1 , ; , 1 1
µ
λ α α α α α λ α λ µ ,  
with   t a Ea = µ . In this case, omission of  λ  would produce inconsistent estimates of 
( ) ( )( ) f f m r r α α α − + + 1 , 1  and thus of the average partial effect of interest. 
The problem is that  t ξ  is likely to be correlated with the regressors since ability is 
correlated across generations. In this case, unless we have a valid identification strategy, 
we cannot identify the causal effect of interest, but we would obtain a sort of reduced 
form estimates that capture also the earning correlation that works through ability. In this 
case, the omission of  λ would add an additional source of bias and we would get an 
inconsistent estimate of “wrong” structural parameter. 
The model developed in this section is simple enough to understand how the intra-
household  balance  of  power  can  potentially  affect  the  degree  of  intergenerational 
mobility. However, there are several simplifying assumptions: there is no distinction 
between investments in human and non-human capital, rates of return on the amount 
invested are constant, and there are no capital market imperfections. Building on the 
seminal  work  of  Becker  and  Tomes  (1986),  these  assumptions  are  relaxed  in  the 
following sections. 
4  Human and non-Human Capital 
A.  Assumptions and Framework 
In this model there are two ways parents can transfer resources to the future generation: 
by investing the amount  t h  in their human capital and by leaving bequests in the form of 
assets,  t k . Thus, the total amount invested in children is given by  t t t k h I + =  . If a 
constant rate of return is a reasonable assumption for non-human capital investments, it   22 
is  likely  to  be  unrealistic  for  the  case  of  investments  in  human  capital
16.  There  are 
different reasons why rates of returns on human capital are a decreasing function of the 
amount invested. Since human capital is embodied in the person and she has limited 
mental and physical capacity, after some points diminishing returns set in. As the stock 
of human capital accumulates it becomes progressively more costly to invest since now 
the opportunity cost is higher. This means that the marginal rate of return declines even 
if  the  dollar  value  of  the  investment  is  the  same.  Furthermore,  since  human  capital 
investments spread over an investment period, later investments would be less profitable 
because the length of time to profit of the investment is lower, determining a reduction 
in the present value of net benefits and thus of rates of return (Becker 1993). 
The amount invested  ( ) t h  in the human capital of children translates into effective 
units of human capital ( ) t H  through the following productive process: 
( ) t t t a h f H , =   with  0 , 0 , 0 , 0 > > < > ha a hh h f f f f ,                                            (23) 
t h  should be viewed as a general form of human capital investment which can include 
expenditures on child’s education, health, the value of in home training and so on. In 
equation  (23)  both  the  amount  invested  by  parents  and  own  ability  positively  affect 
child’s human capital, but greater child’s ability also allows children to benefit more 
from parental investments. Child’s adult earnings  ( ) t W  then depend on human capital 
and market luck: 
  t t t H W ε θ + = ,                                                                                                     (24) 
where θ  is the earnings of one unit of human capital, or equivalently the earnings return 
to human capital. From this it follows that the marginal rate of return on the amount 
invested in human capital is given by: 
( ) , 0 t
h t t h
t
W
f h a R
h
θ
∂
= = >
∂
 with 0 < hh R .                                                              (25) 
                                                 
16 Thus, rates of returns on physical assets are treated as constant. It could be the case that returns on 
portfolio assets depends on individual characteristics. For example, if you have greater human capital you 
are able to pick up better portfolios, but this effect is likely to be rather weak.   23 
We continue to assume ability transmits across generations according to the following 
equation: 
( ) , 1 1 t t t a a a ν η η + + − = −                                                                          
where  a is the average ability in the parents’ generation and  1 − t a  is the average parental 
ability, that is 
2
1 1
1
− −
−
+
=
ft mt
t
a a
a . The other source of income for the child when adult 
is given by the bequests left by the parents, that is  t kk R  , where  k R  is the constant rate 
of return on assets. In this setting parents are concerned about total wealth of the child, 
t k t k R W + ,  and  the  resolution  of  the  household  problem  depends  on  whether  capital 
markets are perfect or imperfect
17. 
 
B.   The Household Problem in Perfect Capital Markets  
In this version of the model
18, no restrictions are imposed on the values  t k can take, but 
it is assumed that parents are able to pass amounts of debt to their children. This means 
that  they  can  borrow  against  their  child’s  future  earnings  to  finance  human  capital 
investments. This form of borrowing would be equivalent to negative values of  t k . For 
example, parents can borrow from a bank to finance schooling expenditures for the child 
and that loan be paid back by the child when adult through his/her earnings capacity. In 
this framework, the household maximization problem takes the following form: 
     ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] t k t m
m m
t t k t f
f f
t
Y C C
k R W v C u k R W v C u Max
t
f m
+ + − + + + − − α λ α λ 1 1
, ,
1         (26)                      
s.t.   0 1 1 1 1 y y y k h C C ft mt t t
f
t
m
t + + = + + + − − − −  
                                                 
17 Note that the simplified model in section 3 can be considered a special case of this more general model. 
A general production function of child quality can be written as  ( ) t t t a i f W ~ , θ =  where  t t a i ~ , represent 
the input of goods and the endowed inputs, respectively. If time inputs are ignored, and if goods have a 
constant marginal product (as in the case in section 3 where rates of returns are constant), this function 
reduces  to  the  additive  function  ( ) ( ) t t t t t t t a i a a i a Y + = + = α β α ~ ~ ~ with  ( ) t t t a a a = ~ ~ β under  the 
simplifying assumption that α  is independent of  t a ~ .  
18  The  distinction  between  perfect  and  imperfect  capital  markets  has  been  introduced  by  Becker  and 
Tomes (1986) and further elaborated by Mulligan (1997,1999)   24 
        t t t H W ε θ + =  
        ( ) t t t a h f H , = . 
where  t k t t k R W Y + = . In this case the following can be proved: 
 
Proposition 3. If capital markets are perfect, all families can afford the efficient level of 
human capital investment. In this case, the amount invested in child’s human capital is 
independent of parental resources, members’ decision power, degree of altruism, but is 
an  increasing  function  of  child’s  ability  and  a  decreasing  function  of  asset  rates  of 
return. 
 
Proof.  The first order conditions of the household maximization problem can be written 
as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 ' '
m f f f
t t t t t t t u Y C h k u C λ λ − − − − − − − − − =                                                  (26a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 ' 1 '
f f
t k t h t f t m t t v W R k R u C λ α λ α λ − − − −   + + − =                                        (26b) 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )
f
t
f
m t f t k t k t C u R k R W v 1 1 1 ' 1 ' − − − = − + + λ α λ α λ ,                                          (26c)                                
where,  as  before  0 1 1 1 y y y Y ft mt t + + = − − − .  After  differentiating  these  first  order 
conditions with respect to  k t t it R a y , , 1 , 1 − − λ , rearranging in matrix form and solving for 
k t t it
t R a y j
j
h
, , , 1 1 − − =
∂
∂
λ  gives: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
1
1 1
'' '' 1 '' ' '
ˆ 1
1 '' '' ' 0
1 '' '' ' ''
i i
i
i
f m f m
t t y y t k
m f t
h k t t y f m
it
m f f
t t y k
v u u u u R
h
R R u u v
y A
u u u v R
γ λ λ λ λ
λ λ λ α α
λ λ λ γ
− − −
− −
−
− −
    − − − −    
∂   = − − − − =  
∂  
  − − +      
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
' ' '' '' 1 '' '' ' ˆ 1
0
' '' 1 '' ''
m f f m f
t k t t f m t
h k f m f
t t k t t
u u u v R u u v h
R R
A u v R u u
λ γ λ λ α α
λ γ λ λ
− − −
− − − −
  − + + − − ∂   = − =  
∂   + − +      
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since by (26b) and (26c) in equilibrium all families make the efficient human capital 
investment, i.e. k h R R = ; note that  ( ) m f t α λ λα γ − + = − 1 1  .  Along the same lines we 
get: 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ 1
1 '' '' ' ' '' '' 1 '' 0
m f f m t
t t t ha t ha k t t
t
h
u u v f v f v R u u
a A
λ λ θγ θγ λ λ − − − − − −
∂   = − − − + − >   ∂
 
( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ 1
' 1 '' '' ' '' '' 1 '' 0
m f f m t
t t t t k t t
k
h
v u u R v v u u
R A
γ λ λ γ λ λ − − − − − −
∂   = − + + − <   ∂
 
since ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 '' '' ' '' ' '' 1 '' 0
m f f m
t t t hh t k hh t t A u u v R v v R R u u γ λ λ γ λ λ − − − − − − = − + + − <
0 , 0 ' ' , ' ' , 0 1 > < > − t ha v u f γ .                                                                                       Q.E.D. 
 
From this it follows that the optimal amount invested in child’s human capital is given 
by: 
( ) k t t R a g h , ˆ = , 0 , 0 < >
k R a g g .                                                                             (27) 
Substituting the optimal amount invested in children into the earnings function we get:  
( ) ( ) ( ) , , , t t k t t t k t W f g a R a a R θ ε ϑ ε = + = + .                                                       (28) 
In this framework, the structural parameter of interest among non-borrowing constrained 
families measures the effect of an exogenous change in parental income on the earnings 
of the adult child keeping ability constant. From equation (28) this parameter is zero. 
This means that there is no direct relationship between parents and child’s incomes. 
However,  if  ability  is  correlated  across  generations,  intergenerational  earnings 
correlation arises due to the correlation of abilities, that is: 
0
0 1
=
= − t da it
t
dy
dW
                                                                                                      (29a) 
i
t
a
a
it
t
dy
dW
ϑ
ϑ η
2 1
=
−
.                                                                                                     (29b) 
It is interesting to see that if there is positive assortative mating between parents based 
on ability, the degree of earnings persistence increases:   26 
( ) a
a
a
it
t R
dy
dW
i
t + =
−
1
2 1 ϑ
ϑ η
,                                                                                           (30) 
where  a R   represents  the  degree  of  positive  sorting  (Becker  1991).  This  means  that 
earnings regress to the mean at a rate proportional to the transmission of ability and 
persistence  is  higher  the  greater  the  degree  of  assortative  mating.  If  earnings  were 
approximately linearly related to ability, mother and father’s ability were equal, and no 
sorting exists, we would back to the unitary case where   .
1
η =
− it
t
dy
dW
  
These  results  show  that  since  capital  markets  are  perfects,  parents  can  separate 
investments in children from their own resources and altruism (as in the unitary model, 
see Becker and Tomes 1986) and also from the members’ bargaining power.  
 
C.  The Household Problem in Imperfect Capital Markets 
If capital markets are imperfect, parents cannot borrow against the future income of the 
child. Transfers between generations are only of one-way type, that is from parents to 
children, but we cannot force children to give parents any asset, i.e. negative values of 
t k are not allowed. The main rationale for this argument is that human capital is very 
poor  collateral  to  lenders.  In  this  framework  shutting  down  this  market  can  lead  to 
inefficiencies since parents do not invest the optimal amount in their kids.  
In this case, the household maximization problem becomes: 
      ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1
, ,
1
m f
t
f f m m
t f t k t t m t k t
C C Y
Max u C v W R k u C v W R k λ α λ α − −     + + + − + +      (31)                      
s.t.   0 1 1 1 1 y y y k h C C ft mt t t
f
t
m
t + + = + + + − − − −  
        t t t H W ε θ + =  
       ( ) t t t a h f H , =  
      . 0 ≥ t k    27 
Solving the household problem, it is easy to show that  k h R R ≥ . Thus, two cases arise: 
when the Lagrange multiplier on the borrowing constraint is zero, 0 > t k , the borrowing 
constraint does not bind and we have that  ( ) k t t h k h R a h f R R
t = ⇔ = ,
* θ . In this case the 
household make the efficient level of human capital investment  ( )
*
t h . Thus, households 
leaving positive bequests behave like households that are non-borrowing constrained, 
and the results of previous section apply. Instead, when the Lagrange multiplier on the 
borrowing constraint is positive,  0 = t k , the borrowing constraints bind and  k h R R > . 
These  households  do  not  make  the  efficient  level  of  human  capital  investment  but 
.
*
t t h h < For these households parental income and the distribution of power within the 
household are important determinants of investments in the future generation, and thus 
of child’s future  economic success. Furthermore, since for these households rates of 
return on human capital investments are higher, redistributive policies can be effective in 
reducing inequality rising efficiency at the same time. 
 
Proposition 4. If capital markets are imperfect and borrowing constraints are binding, 
the amount invested in children is a function of household resources, parents’ degree of 
altruism,  child’s  ability  and  intra-household  balance  of  power.  In  particular,  an 
increase in  1 − t λ has a positive effect on investments in children if the ratio of female to 
male power is sufficiently high. 
 
Proof. Following the same lines as the proof of Proposition 3, we have that for  0 = t k : 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
ˆ 1 1
' '' 1 ' ''
m m f f f f m m t
f t t t m t t t
t t
h
u C u C u C u C
B
α λ α λ
λ γ
− − − − − −
− −
∂   = − −   ∂
           (32)                                                                             
where ( ) , 0 1 1 1 1 > − + = − − − m t f t t α λ α λ γ and
( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 1 1 '' 1 '' '' 1 '' '' ' 0
f m f m
t t t t t h hh B u u u u v R v R λ λ λ λ γ − − − − −    = − − − + − + <    .    28 
This means that, as shown in Proposition 1, an increase in female bargaining power has a 
positive effect on the amount invested in children if and only if the ratio of female to 
male bargaining power is sufficiently high, i.e.  ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1
' ''
1 '' '
f f m m
t t t m
f f m m
t f t t
u C u C
u C u C
λ α
λ α
− − −
− − −
>
−
, or 
equivalently  .
~
λ λ >  From this we have that: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ 1
1 '' ''
1 1
' '' 1 ' ''
it
f m t
t t
it
f f m m f f m m
f t t m t t t y t t
t
h
u u
y B
u C u C u C u C
B
λ λ
α λ α λ λ
γ −
− −
−
− − − − − − −
−
∂   = − − +   ∂
  − −  
(33)              
Thus, an increase in, say, male earnings has two effects on the amount invested. A direct 
positive  effect,  that  we  define  total  resources  effect,  and  express  the  idea  that 
investments in children are normal goods. But we have also a bargaining power effect: a 
change in individual income can affect bargaining power and, in turn, this affects the 
amount of resources invested in children. We define the latter bargaining power effect.  
The effect of altruism and ability are given respectively by: 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1
ˆ 1
' '' 1 '' 0
f m t
h t t t
f
h
v R u u
B
λ λ λ
α
− − −
∂
= + − >
∂
                                                    (34) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
ˆ 1
' 1 '' 1 '' 0
f m t
h t t t
m
h
v R u u
B
λ λ λ
α
− − −
∂
= − + − >
∂
                                           (35) 
( )
￿
1 1 1
1
ˆ '' 1 ''
'' '
f m
t t t
t a h ha
t
u u h
f R v v f
a B
λ λ
θγ
− − −
−
+ −
+
  + − ∂   = +
  ∂
 
￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿
.                                      (36) 
Note  that  the  







+ =
∂
∂
+ −
−
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ha h a
t
t f v v R f sign
a
h
sign ' ' '
ˆ
1 .  Ability  has  now  two  effects  on  the 
amount invested in children: a negative income effect and a positive substitution effect. 
The negative income effect arises from the fact that children with greater ability are 
richer, and expenditures of children are discouraged when children are expected to be 
richer. The positive substitution effect derives from the fact that higher ability increases   29 
the marginal rates of return on children encouraging investments( ) 0 > ha f . The  total 
effect  is  thus  ambiguous.  However,  for  usual  form  assumptions  about  utilities  and 
human  capital  production  function  the  substitution  effect  is  likely  to  dominate  the 
income effect. Note that equation (19) can be viewed as a special case of (36) where the 
substitution effect is zero.                                                                                          Q.E.D.                                                 
From this it follows that we can write  ( ) i t t t t a Y g h α λ , , , ˆ
1 1
*
− − = , which, inserted in 
the child’s earning equation gives: 
( ) ( ) ( )
* *
1 1 1 1 , , , , , , , t t t t i t t t t t i t W f g Y a a Y a θ λ α ε ϑ λ α ε − − − − = + = + .                           (37) 
Child’s  adult  earnings  depend  now  directly  on  parental  resources  and  also  on  the 
distribution of the members’ bargaining power. Suppose we are interested in the effect 
of  father  earnings  on  children’s  earnings,  the  most  commonly  estimated  empirical 
relationship. The structural parameter of interest is give by an increase in father earnings 
keeping ability constant, that is: 
m t
t
y Y
da mt
t
dy
dW
λ ϑ ϑ λ
* *
0 1
1 + =
−
= −
,                                                                                  (38) 
which, differently from the unitary models, is the sum of a direct total resources effect 
and  the  bargaining  power  effect.  This  expression  shows  an  important  feature  of  the 
model,  that  is  the  fact  that  higher  father  earnings  affect  directly  and  indirectly  the 
amount invested in children and thus children’s outcomes. The most basic reason why 
parental income is a very important determinant of children performance is that if the 
amount  invested  in  children  is  a  normal  good  (as  the  positive  total  resources  effect 
show), then better off households can buy better food, housing, medical care and we 
should  therefore  observe  better  child’s  outcomes.  This  reasoning  however  would  be 
incomplete if we would not take into account that an increase in father’s income affects 
spouses’ bargaining power and thus child’s outcomes. If the bargaining power effect is 
positive we would observe a reinforcement of the total resources effect, and the reverse 
is true if the bargaining power effect is negative.   30 
The total effect of father earnings on children earning is given by the sum of these 
two effects and an indirect effect that works through the inheritability of abilities: 
1
*
* *
*
1 2
t
t m
m
a t
Y y
mt a
dW
dy
λ
ϑ η
ϑ ϑ λ
ϑ
−
−
= + + .                                                                             (39) 
The standard unitary model predicts stronger ties between parents’ and child’s earnings 
among families that are borrowing constrained, and this prediction has been object of 
empirical  research  with  mixed  results  as  reviewed  in  section  2.  This  is  in  fact  an 
important  question  from  a  policy  point  of  view.  If  greater  persistence  is  due  to  the 
presence of borrowing constraints then there is a scope for policy interventions aimed at 
increase social mobility. However, a comparison of equations (38) and (39) suggests that 
the  way  we  model  household  decision  making  has  important  consequences  for  the 
planning of public policies. It is still true that in the perfect capital market case (and in 
the group of rich household in the borrowing constraint model) earnings regress fast to 
the mean at a rate proportional to the transmission of abilities, but it would be wrong to 
assume  that  borrowing  constraints  bind  in  the  same  manner  among  households  not 
leaving bequests to their children. The collective model of the household allows us to 
introduce a very important source of heterogeneity across households. Even for the same 
level  of  household  income,  families  can  greatly  differ  in  the  way  resources  and 
bargaining  power  are  distributed  across  members,  and  they  differ  also  in  the  way 
bargaining  power  affects  child’s  outcome.  The  model  suggests  that  borrowing 
constraints  matter  for  children’s  future  outcome  since  there  are  likely  limits  on 
educational and other human capital investment choices, but they matter to a different 
extent across households, since families differ in the way bargaining power is allocated 
across members and thus in the way resources are invested in children. We would expect 
borrowing  constraints  tighten  more  the  link  between  father  and  child’s  earnings  in 
households where the bargaining power effect is positive, that is in households where the 
lack of resources represents a greater problem because there is a greater willingness to 
invest in children. Thus, the direct relation between father’s and child’s earnings does   31 
not need to be linear, but it varies across the distribution of  1 − t λ . Consider, for example, 
the Cobb Douglas example of section 3. There we have that:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
1 0
1 1
1
t
t t
t f t m f m yi t
it da
dY a
r Y
dy r
λ α λ α α α λ − − −
− =
   
= + + − + − +     +    
, 
where  ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 1 t f t m r λ α λ α − − + + −   is  the  positive  total  resources  effect,  and 
( )( ) 1
1
1
1
t t
yi f m t yi
t
a Y
r Y
r
λ α α λ
λ
−
−
∂  
− + + =   + ∂  
  is the bargaining power effect.  
For  these  reasons,  empirical  tests  of  the  borrowing  constraints  model  might  be 
misleading if we ignore this important source of household heterogeneity. Alleviation of 
borrowing constraints might therefore have the greatest impact in families where the 
household  structure  is  such  that  there  is  a  great  willingness  to  invest  in  children. 
Neglecting of this aspect could reduce the efficacy of policies aiming at the alleviation 
of borrowing constraints. 
4.1  An Extension: Parents and Child’s Human Capital 
Up  to  this  point  we  considered  households  as  having  the  same  technology  for  the 
production  of  human  capital.  One  way  to  relax  this  assumption  and  introduce 
heterogeneity in the production of child’s human capital is to expand equation (23) in the 
following way: 
( ) 1 1, , , − − = ft mt t t t H H a h f H ,                                                                                   (40) 
with 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 > > < > ha a hh h f f f f , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 > > > >
m f m f hH hH H H f f f f . This captures 
the idea that greater parental human capital positively affects children’s human capital as 
well  as  the  returns  to  investment.  More  educated  parents  are  in  fact  more  efficient 
producers  of  child  human  capital.  They  are  likely  to  get  more  output  from  a  given 
amount of inputs because their greater level of education is such that they can get the 
same task done more efficiently, this is the concept of productive (or worker) efficiency 
which refers to the marginal product of education( ) 0 > H f .  But greater parental human 
capital can also allow parents to select better inputs. For example, they can select better   32 
schools, they are more aware of the benefits of a good diet for the child and so on, and 
this is likely to increase the productivity of the amount invested in children.   
We might be interested to see how parental human capital affects child’s human 
capital and thus, the degree of intergenerational mobility. Let’s first consider the effect 
of an increase in, say, female human capital, for the perfect capital market case. 
 
A.  Perfect Capital Markets 
Differentiating the first order conditions of the household problem with respect to female 
human capital and following the lines of previous pages, straightforward calculations 
show that:  
( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ 1
' 1 '' '' '' '' 1 '' 0
f
m f f m t
t hH t t t k t t
f
h
v f u u v R u u
H A
γ θ λ λ γ λ λ − − − − − −
∂   = − − − + − >   ∂
, 
                                                                                                                                        (41) 
 since  0 , 0 > <
f hH f A  .      
From this, we have that: 
  ( ) m f k t t H H R a g h , , , ~ ˆ =   and  ( ) ( ) m f t m f k t t H H a H H R a g f H , , , , , , ~ = ,                       (42)  
Then, the impact of an increase of mother human capital on child’s human capital is 
given by: 
0 ~ ~
1
> + =
∂
∂
−
f f H H g
ft
t f g f
H
H
,                                                                                  (43) 
and in the case of positive assortative mating between parents’ education levels: 
    ( ) 0 ~ ~ ~
1
> + + + =
∂
∂
−
H H H H H H g
ft
t
m f m f f f g g f
H
H
β β ,                                                    (44) 
where  0 > H β   measures the positive degree of sorting and derives form the following 
matching function:  1 1 0 1 − − − + + = t ft H mt v H H β β . Finally, we have that: 
( ) 1 1 , , , t t mt ft k t W a H H R ϑ ε − − = + ￿                                                                              (45)   33 
In  this  case,  even  in  absence  of  inheritability  of  abilities,  earnings  persist  across 
generations  because  fathers  with  greater  human  capital  have  higher  earnings,  their 
children accumulate  greater human capital and thus will have greater  earnings  when 
adults: 
  
m m
t
H
mt
m
H
da mt
t
y
H
dy
dW
ϑ
θ
ϑ
~ 1 ~
1 0 1
=
∂
∂
=
− = −
.                                                                  (46) 
This allows also earnings persistence to differ depending on whether father or mother 
earnings are measured. If rates of return on human capital were the same for males and 
females  ( ) θ θ θ = = f m  but mother human capital is a more important determinant of 
child’s  human  capital 
m f H H ϑ ϑ
~ ~
> ,  then  earnings  would  be  more  persistent  when 
measured with respect to the mother. 
Depending on whether intergenerational earnings correlations are due simply to the 
correlation of abilities or also of human capital might be important from a policy point of 
view. Society might not be willing to level the playing field if the only circumstance 
trough which parents affect children outcome is transmissions of abilities, but it might be 
willing to level the playing field if parental human capital is the key determinant of 
children’s economic success. In this case, even if capital markets are perfect and families 
can afford the efficient level of investment, differences in earnings can still arise if there 
is human capital heterogeneity in the parental generation, since families with greater 
human  capital  will  invest  more  in  their  children.  In  this  case,  redistributive  policies 
might  well  reduce  inequality  in  schooling  and  earnings,  but  at  the  cost  of  reducing 
efficiency. 
 
B.  Imperfect Capital Markets 
The dynamics of human capital transmission across generations are more complicated to 
analyze in this case, since parents’ human capital will have a direct effect on children 
outcomes as well as an indirect effect through income and members’ bargaining power.   34 
In this case, it is possible to show that a compensated increase in female human capital is 
given by: 
( ) ( )
f f hH h h t
m
t
f
t
H
t
t
f
t f v v R f
B
u u h
H
h
' ' '
' ' 1 ' ' ˆ ˆ
1
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1 1 +
− +
+
∂
∂
=
∂
∂
−
− −
−
− − θγ
λ λ
λ
λ
,                    (47) 
which is ambiguous a priori. Nevertheless, we are able to see the different mechanisms 
by which mother human capital affects children.  
The optimal amount invested in children is now a function not only of household 
resources,  female  bargaining  power  and  ability,  but  also  of  parents’  human  capital: 
( ) f m t t t t H H Y a g h , , , , ~ ˆ
1 1
*
− − = λ  and  ( ) ( ) m f t m f t t t t H H a H H Y a g f H , , , , , , , ~
1 1
*
− − = λ  
and from this we have that (abstracting from positive assortative mating): 
f t f f f H
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ft
t f
H
y
g
H
y
g g g f
H
H
+ 







∂
∂
+
∂
∂
+ + =
∂
∂
−
−
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This expression rationalizes the different channels of transmission of human capital from 
mother to children that most empirical work tried to identify especially with data on 
developing countries. We have a positive direct effect which captures the productive 
efficiency story described above, 0 >
f H f , and a positive income effect 
f
f
Y H
y
g
t ∂
∂
−
*
1
~  since 
the amount invested in children is a normal good. The term 
* ~
f H g is ambiguous a priori 
since, as in the case of ability, it captures income and substitution effects working in 
opposite directions: the negative income effect arises from the fact that children from 
parents  with  greater  human  capital  are  richer,  and  expenditures  of  children  are 
discouraged when children are expected to be richer. The positive substitution effect 
derives from the fact that greater parental human capital increases the marginal rates of 
return  on  children  encouraging  investments( ) 0 > hH f .  If  the  allocative  effect  of 
education is strong, the substitution effect is likely to dominate. Furthermore, we have 
bargaining power effects. Grater female human capital can improve woman’s stand in 
the household both directly  ( )
f H λ and indirectly through  and increase in her  earning   35 
power ( )
f y λ . If greater female power positively affects investments in children, then we 
would have a potentially other important transmission mechanism through which mother 
education affects child’s human capital. To the best of out knowledge, this pathway of 
influence has not been explored in empirical work, and could be an interesting area for 
future research. 
Finally, the correlation between parents and children’s human capital might add an 
additional  source  of  earnings  correlation  across  generations,  which  can  weaken  or 
reinforce persistence according to its strength. Letting:  
( ) ( ) ( ) t ft mt t t t t m f t m f t t t t H H Y a H H a H H Y a g f W ε λ ϑ ε λ θ + = + = − − − − − − 1 1 1 1
*
1 1
* , , , ,
~
, , , , , , , ~  
we have that our structural parameter of interest is given by: 
1
* *
0 1
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1
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+ + =
−
it
i
H y Y
da it
t
y
H
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dW
i i t
t
ϑ λ ϑ ϑ λ .                                                                (49) 
 
5   Intergenerational Consumption Mobility 
While earnings are the most widely used measure of economic status in the study of 
intergenerational mobility, consumption might be more interesting because it is more 
closely  related  to  welfare.  However,  except  for  Mulligan  (1997,  1999),  a  detailed 
analysis  of  consumption  mobility  is  scarce.  In  this  section  we  extend  the  collective 
model of the household to study consumption mobility from a theoretical point of view. 
To derive analytical solutions for the collective consumption expansion path, we 
follow Mulligan (1997, 1999) in making the following functional form assumptions
19 
and we write our collective household problem in terms of woman, man and child’s 
consumption( ) t C : 
( )
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1
, , , ,
1
1 1 1 1 m f t t t
ft t mt t
t f t m
C C C h k
C C C C
Max
π π π π
λ α λ α
π π π π
− − − −
− −
− −
   
+ + − +       − − − −    
,                         (50) 
s.t.  t k t t k t t k R H k R W C + = + = θ  
                                                 
19 Differently from the author, however, we do not explicitly model uncertainty.   36 
      ( )
τ
t t t t t h a h a f H = = ,  
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The solution set then depends on whether the Lagrange multiplier on the non negativity 
constraint is positive or zero.  
 
A. Perfect capital markets 
If capital markets are perfect, no restrictions are imposed on the values  t k can take. In 
this case, from the first order conditions of the household maximization problem, we 
have: 
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From  this,  several  manipulations  lead  to  the  following  evolution  equations  for 
consumption: 
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In  this  case,  our  structural  parameter  of  interest  which  measures  persistence  of  log 
consumption, is given by the effect of an exogenous change in parental consumption, 
and is equal to one for both male and female consumption. Thus, as in the unitary case, 
the  model  would  predict  that  consumption  would  not  regress  to  the  mean  across 
generations.  Mulligan  (1997  1999)  notes  that  in  the  unitary  case  this  prediction  is 
counterfactual. In particular, he analyzes how heterogeneity in altruism bias downward 
estimates of consumption persistence across non-borrowing constrained families. With 
enough heterogeneity in altruism, estimates of log consumption persistence might give a 
coefficient less than one. However, if we instrument parental consumption with parental 
income in order to correct for this source of heterogeneity we should get a coefficient of   37 
one. But his estimates do not support this conclusion, and the author suggests that his 
endogenous altruism model is the only one able to predict regression to the mean in 
consumption  even  among  non-borrowing  constrained  families,  consistently  with  the 
data. 
Our model, however, allows us to derive different conclusions. First, it outlines how 
the relevant consumption measure is an individual one; in fact the model  gives two 
evolution equations for consumption. Second, it is important to note that even in absence 
of heterogeneity in altruism, household heterogeneity introduced by  1 − t λ and ignored by 
(or  unobserved  to)  the  econometrician  might  still  lead  to  a  persistence  of  log 
consumption less than one. In this case, trying to control for heterogeneity in altruism 
alone might not be enough to reject the null hypothesis of a coefficient equal to one if we 
do not control also for heterogeneity in 1 − t λ . These conclusions can be summarized by 
the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5. When capital markets are perfect, consumption does not regress to the 
mean across generations (i.e. consumption elasticity is equal to 1). However if there is 
heterogeneity in female household bargaining power, OLS estimates of the degree of 
consumption  persistence  would  be    inconsistent    even  in  absence  of  heterogeneous 
altruism rates. 
 
Proof. Suppose there is no heterogeneity in altruism rates. We can rewrite equation (52) 
as: 
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factors. Then we have that:   38 
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This would add to the source of bias generated by heterogeneous ability and altruism 
identified in Han and Mulligan (2001). Note that since  1 − t λ does not affect the amount 
invested in children in the perfect capital market model, it does not enter the earnings 
equation. Heterogeneity in  1 − t λ thus would not add a new source of inconsistency to 
estimated degree of earnings persistence in the perfect capital market case. 
 
B. Imperfect capital markets 
When the Lagrange multiplier is greater than zero,  0 > t k , and borrowing constraints are 
not binding. In this case, the evolution equation of consumption is the same as in the 
perfect  capital  market  case.  In  this  case,  however,  it  is  not  possible  to  obtain  an 
analytical expression for the inconsistency due to ignored or unobserved heterogeneity in 
1 − t λ , since we should compute conditional expectations given the selection rule, which 
is complicated. In this case, estimates of the degree of consumption persistence would 
suffer from an additional negative omitted variable bias and a selection bias whose sign 
is ambiguous. Following Han and Mulligan 2001, several calculations allow us to show 
that the selection rule in our collective framework is given by: 
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When borrowing constraints are binding,  0 = t k  and we obtain the following evolution 
equations of consumption: 
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where 
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1
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1
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π
τ
β .  In  this  case,  the  model  would  predict  that  consumption 
regresses to the mean across generations. Also in this case, unaccounted heterogeneity in 
1 − t λ adds an additional negative omitted variable bias and a selection bias whose sign is 
ambiguous, and the magnitude cannot be computed analytically. 
The model in (50) assumes that mother and father have the same degree of relative 
risk aversion ( ) π , or equivalently the same elasticity of substitution  





π
1
. A special case 
is given by  1 = π  with utility functions reducing to a simple log-log functional form. 
This assumption, however, might be restrictive if we assume that the willingness to trade 
off  consumption  at  different  points  in  time  is  an  individual  rather  than  household 
characteristic. We could then reformulate the problem above assuming different degrees 
of intertemporal substitution between men and women,  f m π π ,  . However, the price to 
pay in this case is that closed form solutions for the evolution equations for consumption 
cannot  be  obtained.  Several  calculations  show  that  we  can  only  derive  children 
consumption  as  an  implicit  function  of  parents’  consumption  and  female  bargaining 
power: 
( ) 1 1, ln ln − − = t ft f t C C λ χ                                                                                        (57a) 
( ) 1 1, ln ln − − = t mt m t C C λ χ ,                                                                                    (57b)   40 
whose derivatives can be computed analytically. For the perfect capital market case and 
for the group of families with  0 > t k in the imperfect capital market case we have that: 
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In  the  unitary  case,  Mulligan  (1997)  demonstrates  that  regression  to  the  mean  in 
consumption even among non-borrowing constrained families contradicts the prediction 
of  the  Becker’s  model.  However,  in  our  collective  setting,  we  have  that  even  when 
capital markets are perfect or families leave positive bequests, we could have a value of 
the consumption elasticity less than one, depending on the relative magnitudes of the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of different members.  
Analogously, for the borrowing constrained families it is possible to show that: 
( ) t t ft f f t a C C , , ln ln 1 1 − − = λ β ψ                                                                             (60a) 
( ) t t mt m m t a C C , , ln ln 1 1 − − = λ β ψ ,                                                                          (60b) 
whose derivatives computed analytically are given by: 
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Thus, for example, in the case female elasticity of substitution is greater than that of the 
male, the child’s consumption elasticity with respect to mother’s consumption would be 
less  than  one  in  both  the  perfect  and  imperfect  capital  market  model,  with  a  lower 
absolute value in the latter.    
Most of the empirical literature on intergenerational mobility focuses on the analysis 
of  intergenerational  earnings  mobility.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  except  for 
Mulligan  (1997,  1999),  no  contributions  have  been  made  to  the  study  of 
intergenerational  consumption  mobility  from  both  a  theoretical  and  empirical 
perspective. Clearly as interesting it might be the estimation of consumption mobility the 
problem is that the estimation of these relationships might be too demanding for most 
datasets,  since  in  general  there  is  no  information  on  individual  consumption  levels. 
Furthermore, this study highlights the importance of the intergenerational elasticity of 
substitution, about which empirical knowledge is terribly limited. Nevertheless, if we 
believe that the household are better to be treated as a collection of individuals and if 
“who gets what” in the household matters as much previous research indicated, greater 
efforts are needed to collect information at both household and individual level. In our 
context,  this  could  be  of  great  help  for  a  deeper  understanding  of  intergenerational 
consumption mobility which, we believe, constitute an important aspect of a country 
aspect of welfare inequality. 
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6   Summary and Conclusions  
The transmission of economic status from one generation to the next is a potentially 
important source of inequality. However, considerably less research has been conducted 
compared to the analysis of cross sectional inequality, especially from a theoretical point 
of view.  
From  a  policy  point  of  view  it  is  important  to  understand  the  channels  of 
transmission of economic status from one generation to the next. A society might be 
willing to level the playing field if disparities arise, for example, from the presence of 
liquidity constraints, discrimination or local segregation, but might be less willing to do 
so if disparities are the results of different genetic abilities, beliefs and so on. There is 
substantial  evidence  that  persistence  of  economic  status  across  generations  is  quite 
strong, but what are the sources? 
The  characteristic  of  the  economic  approach  to  the  study  of  intergenerational 
mobility  is  that  it  does  not  consider  the  transmission  of  economic  status  between 
generations as the result of a mechanical process, but individual choices and behaviors 
are  viewed  as  its  key  determinant.  Parents’  choices  about  the  division  of  resources 
between themselves and their children will affect their offspring human capital level and 
economic  success.  Standard  economic  models  of  intergenerational  mobility  consider 
individuals with finite lifetimes who care about their children. In this setting, however, 
marriage and household structure are ignored, and the household is treated as a single 
decision unit.  
In this paper we study how family’s decisions about investments in human and non-
human capital of children are an important determinant of adult’s earnings and thus of 
persistence in income differentials. We propose a theoretical model of investments in 
children that allows parents to have different preferences, and investigate how the intra-
household distribution of power affects children’s outcomes and thus intergenerational 
mobility. We find that the distribution of decision power within the household matters 
for children’s outcomes. Interestingly, we find that the effect of an increase in female 
bargaining power on the amount invested in children is not monotonic, but depends on   43 
the level of power the woman start with. The most important result related to the explicit 
consideration  of  individual  preferences  of  single  family  members  in  the  collective 
framework is that household income dynamics are determined not only by the parents’ 
degree of altruism but also by the distribution of power within the household.   
Through the analysis of a centralized collective model in the simplest set-up with no 
distinction between investments in human and non-human capital, it is shown that the 
standard unitary model ignores the effect of changes in the relative decision of power on 
the equilibrium value of the income of the future generations. 
When  we  allow  for  both  human  and  non-human  capital  investments  and  capital 
markets are perfect, the model shows that the amount invested in children is independent 
of the level of household resources and parental altruism, as in the standard unitary case, 
and is also independent of the distribution of the resources within the household. In this 
case,  the  absence  of  borrowing  constraints  allows  parents  to  separate  the  amount 
invested in children not only from total resources and altruism but also from the relative 
power of single members. Thus, the amount invested in children’s human capital is a 
function only of ability and interest rate. Parental income has therefore no causal effect 
on  children’s  earnings,  and  earnings  transmit  across  generations  at  a  rate  that  is  a 
function of the intergenerational transmission of abilities. 
When capital markets are imperfect, the collective model of the household allows us 
to introduce a very important source of heterogeneity across families. For the same level 
of household income, families can greatly differ in the way resources and bargaining 
power are distributed across members, and they differ also in the way bargaining power 
affects  children’s  outcome.  The  amount  invested  in  children’s  human  capital  is  thus 
function  not  only  of  total  household  resources  but  also  of  the  distribution  of  power 
within the household, as well as of ability and parental altruism. In this setting, higher 
father earnings affect directly and indirectly the amount invested in children and thus 
children’s outcomes. The most basic reason why parental income is a very important 
determinant of children’s performance is that if the amount invested in children is a 
normal good, then better off households can buy better food, housing, medical care and   44 
we should therefore observe better children’s outcomes. This reasoning however would 
be incomplete if we do not take into account that an increase in father’s income affects 
spouses’ bargaining power and thus the amount invested in children. If the bargaining 
power effect is positive we would observe a reinforcement of the total resources effect, 
and the reverse is true if the bargaining power effect is negative. The total effect of 
father’s earnings on children’s earnings is given by the sum of these two effects and an 
indirect  effect  that  works  through  the  inheritability  of  abilities.  The  same  reasoning 
would apply to the effect of mother’s earnings. However, the model would allow for a 
different impact through a differential effect of mother and father’s earnings on the intra-
household balance of power. 
The model suggests that borrowing constraints matter for children’s future outcome 
since there are likely limits on educational and other human capital investment choices, 
but they matter to a different extent across households, since families differ in the way 
bargaining power is allocated across members and thus in the way resources are invested 
in children. We would expect borrowing constraints tighten more the link between father 
and child’s earnings in households where lack of resources represents a greater problem 
because there is a greater willingness to invest in children. 
The  model  is  extended  to  allow  for  heterogeneous  production  function  of  child 
human  capital  across  households  allowing  parental  human  capital  to  affect  the 
accumulation of child human capital. The idea is that greater parental human capital 
positively affects children’s human capital as well as the returns to investment. In the 
case of perfect capital markets the model shows that even in absence of inheritability of 
abilities, earnings persist across generations because of the correlation in human capital 
across  generations.  In this case, even if  all families can afford the  efficient level of 
investment, differences in earnings arise if there is heterogeneity in human capital in the 
parents’  generation.  When  borrowing  constraints  are  binding,  intergenerational 
dynamics are more complicated to analyze since parents’ human capital has a direct 
effect on children’s outcomes as well as an indirect effect through income and household   45 
members’ decision power. The model allows us to explicitly disentangle the different 
channels through which parental education affects children’s human capital.  
The  fact  that  parental  and  especially  maternal  education  positively  affects  child 
health  and  education  is  a  well  known  empirical  result  in  the  economic  literature. 
However,  this  issue  has  been  traditionally  analyzed  in  the  framework  of  the  unitary 
model.  Our  set-up  displays  another  potentially  important  transmission  channel  from 
maternal  education  to  child’s  health.  Maternal  education  can  positively  affects  the 
relative status-power of women within the household, thus influencing the allocation of 
resources invested in  children, even  for the same level of  actual or potential female 
income and labor force participation. This could also potentially help to understand some 
of the unexplained part of the effect of mother’s education in previous studies about this 
issue  especially  in  developing  countries.  Empirical  evidence  that  improvement  in 
mother’s  education  increases  her  decision  power  within  the  household  and  thereby 
affects children’s outcomes would provide an  additional strong rationale for policies 
aimed at improving children’s welfare. 
The final part of the paper analyzes intergenerational consumption mobility. While 
earnings  are  the  most  widely  used  measure  of  economic  status  in  the  study  of 
intergenerational mobility, consumption might be more interesting because it is more 
closely  related  to  welfare.  However,  except  for  Mulligan  (1997,  1999),  a  detailed 
analysis of consumption mobility is scarce. Thus, we extend Mulligan into a collective 
framework.  
The  results  show  that  when  capital  markets  are  perfect,  consumption  does  not 
regress to the mean across generations, analogously to the unitary model. However, the 
collective model allows us to introduce heterogeneity in female household bargaining 
power as another potential source of heterogeneity, in addition to heterogeneous altruism 
rates considered by Hahn and Mulligan (2001), which can potentially affects the degree 
of  consumption  persistence.  The  model  also  shows  that  when  capital  markets  are 
imperfect,  unaccounted  heterogeneity  in  1 − t λ can  affect  the  degree  of  consumption 
persistence.   46 
When we extend the model to allow for different degrees of intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution between household members we have that –contrary to the unitary model- 
with perfect capital markets or positive bequests it is possible to have a value of the 
consumption  elasticity  less  than  one,  depending  on  the  relative  magnitudes  of  the 
intertemporal  elasticity  of  substitution  of  different  members.  This  highlights  the 
important  role  the  intergenerational  elasticity  of  substitution  can  play  in 
intergenerational  consumption  mobility,  about  which  empirical  knowledge  is  terribly 
limited. 
These results altogether suggest that failure to account for intrahousehold balance of 
power as source of household heterogeneity might thus affect the interpretation of the 
structural parameters of interest and the estimation of both earnings and consumption 
persistence.  
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